The present paper develops arguments for the need to formulate the basic theories of physics in terms of a six-dimensional manifold, as opposed to the four-dimensional space-time continuum of conventional theory. Employing a purely classical approach, some of the dynamical consequences of such a formulation with regard to both electrodynamics and gravitation are evaluated. The results lead to interesting implications with regard to various questions such as the occurrence and importance of superluminal particles, the existence of two or more physically (...) distinct time scales, and the variation of the gravitational coupling constant G and the law of energy conservation. The analysis also suggests a physical interpretation of the additional coordinates that occur in the metric. (shrink)

We construct a Hilbert style system RPL for the notion of plausibility measure introduced by Halpern J, and we prove the soundness and completeness with respect to a neighborhood style semantics. Using the language of RPL, we demonstrate that it can define well-studied notions of necessity, conditionals and propositional identity.

In this article I have tried to rebut certain types of arguments which purport to show not merely that God does not exist but that the notion of necessary existence is itself either self-contradictory or senseless. In showing that it is not self-contradictory I have allowed myself the luxury of a negative and a positive approach. Negatively, I have had to show that when the accusation of self-contradiction is made, it is often accompanied, not by an argument but by a (...) sheer assertion. On the rare occasions when an argument is forthcoming, the arguments, I have tried to show, have been invalid, not even, inconclusive. And to the extent that Kant may be said to have argued not simply the impossibility of a genuine proof of the existence of God, but indeed the impossibility of the concept of necessary existence, I have argued out the weakness of Kant's arguments, the most notable of which I have discussed in some detail. Finally, to establish the genuineness of the concept of necessary existence, positively, I have paradoxically made use of a notion from Russell's logic. (shrink)

Neutral monist, panpsychist, naturalist, and phenomenological interpretations of James's theory of mind are canvassed. Culling the true tenets from each, I make a case for a reconciling view on the basis of a distinction between mental and proto-mental properties. The resulting interpretation is compared to two forms of panpsychism identified by T Nagel in his essay of that name.

I find this postulate of Mr. Blanshard's puzzling, and I wish to exhibit some perplexing features of it, and therefore of the business of the philosopher as he understands it.

The different distribution of "sexual strength" throughout the female and male life-span, and the resulting social backlogs of unsatisfaction in older women and young men, are cited as natural conditions having as final upshots the inferior social status ascribed to women and the permanent tendency toward war. To break the constellation of sexual adaptations which aggravates the tendencies toward war, the author suggests the introduction of "more generosity" into sex, i.e., the discarding of absolutist sex ideology.--E. W.

A paradox is a situation in which two seemingly equally rational lines of thought lead to contradictory conclusions. A moral paradox is a situation where the employment of diverse moral principles, each of which is at least intuitively acceptable to roughly the same degree, leads to radically different moral assessments of one and the same action. In his “Some Paradoxes of Deterrence” Gregory Kavka argues that such moral paradoxes lurk in the concept of deterrence and further that the present world (...) situation of mutual nuclear deterrence may well provide a concrete illustration of these paradoxes. That deterrence can involve paradox may well be true, but what I wish to consider here is whether the case of nuclear deterrence is in fact an instance of “paradoxical deterrence”. (shrink)

I offer here a solution to a mystery about William James's theory of the self. Among the many students of James who have been mystified is Gerald Myers, who expresses surprise in William James: His Life and Thought that, given the religious and mystical overtones of his later metaphysics, James did not abandon the apparent bodily self of the earlier Principles of Psychology for a “nonbodily, spiritual, and mysterious referent for the first-person pronoun,” instead of consistently adhering “to his claims (...) that the body is at the center of any experience of self, that nothing nonbodily shows itself definitely to introspection, and that nothing about using I makes a mystery of the self”. The mystery is particularly deep because James explicitly avowed the coherence of the Principles treatment of the self with the later metaphysical treatment, such as the material in Essays in Radical Empiricism. Arguing in “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” from the Essays that a metaphysics of pure experience should replace the dichotomy between consciousness and the body, James adduces in support his earlier discussion of the self: “In my Psychology I have tried to show that we need no knower other than the ‘passing thought’.” On the other hand, Myers observes, “if telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognition actually occur,” as James was disposed to think, “our everyday equation of the self with bodily experience will surely require some revision”. Then too James's religious convictions as expressed in The Varieties of Religious Experience would also seem to call for revision of the earlier equation. James wrote there, for instance, that “the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its chief significance” and that “union or harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end.” “Yet instead of suggesting how his psychological concept of the self might have shifted during the progression from Principles to the metaphysics of pure experience,” Myers comments with a note of puzzlement, “James wrote in his later period that this concept was a natural ally if not the original herald of that metaphysics.”. (shrink)

Physique de Nietzsche uses Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle to suggest a reading of Nietzsche escaping the "circle of metaphysics". It thereby questions Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche as the last metaphysician. Just as for Heidegger’s Aristotle φύσις is ὁδὸς εἰς φύσιν, so for Juranville’s Nietzsche will is will to power. The will to power must be understood not in terms of will but in terms of power. Nietzsche interprets the world physically and nontechnically as will to power, i.e., as life, energy, (...) force, power, fatum, "Physis". Will to power, the innermost essence of things, is a kind of internal principle of motion analogous to Aristotelian φύσις. (shrink)

Beauchamp and Childress here collaborate to provide a set of action-guides or principles which in their judgment apply to a wide range of biomedical problems. Their work consists of eight chapters and two appendices. In the first two chapters attention centers on the nature of a moral dilemma and moral reasoning and on types of normative ethical theories. Chapters 3 through 6 discuss the principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice, while chapters 7 and 8 deal, respectively, with the professional-patient (...) relationship and with the role that virtues, ideals, personal integrity, and conscience have to play in the moral life. Appendix I provides twenty-nine case studies illustrating dilemmas in biomedical ethics, and reference to those studies is made throughout the text. Appendix II gives the texts of important biomedical codes of ethics. (shrink)

New foreword written by HeritageMom, Amber O'Neal Johnston. "During a time when the United States needed to be reminded of the contributions Black people have made to its democracy, freedom, music, literature, and more, W.E.B. Du Bois took on the task of enumerating the gifts that we've provided to our country. "When I began reading The Gift of Black Folk...the story that unfolded was one that I had never anticipated. We the People of the United States, all of us, have (...) left our indelible mark on America the Beautiful." -Amber O'Neal Johnston In 1924, William Edward Burghardt (W.E.B.) Du Bois (1868-1963) penned The Gift of Black Folk in response to systemic racism in the United States, showing that "...the American spirit is a new and interesting result of diverse threads of thought and feeling coming not only from America but from Europe and Asia and indeed from Africa." Du Bois was the first African American to earn a Ph.D. from Harvard University, and later became a professor of history, sociology, and economics at Atlanta University. In 1909 he co-founded the NAACP. Du Bois was a lifelong leader and proponent of civil rights. Amber O'Neal Johnston is a writer, speaker, and home educator who blends life-giving books with a culturally-rich environment for her four children and others. She's the author of A Place to Belong, a guide for families of all backgrounds to celebrate cultural heritage and embrace inclusivity in the home and beyond, and she's known for sharing literary "mirrors and windows" on HeritageMom.com. (shrink)

I give a brief precis of Lyons' book. I discuss the problem of delineating basic from non-basic beliefs. I argue that one of Lyons' possible solutions doesn't work - his definition of a perceptual module does not allow us to decide which beliefs are basic. And I argue that another possible solution undermines some of Lyons' motivation. The intuitive understanding of belief may not generate the Clairvoyancy troubles he fears.

The two interpretations with which La Croix is dissatisfied are 1) the traditional view, which focuses exclusively on St. Anselm’s argument for the existence of God in Proslogion II; and 2) the newer view, championed by Hartshorne and Malcolm, which claims that the argument in Proslogion III supercedes the material in Proslogion II, and is immune from the traditional criticisms. Neither view is correct, La Croix argues, because both assume that Proslogion II and III are logically separable. La Croix places (...) extreme emphasis on Anselm’s assertion in the Preface to the Proslogion that he found "one argument" by means of which he could prove both that God exists and that God possesses the traditional divine attributes. According to La Croix, the overall structure of the Proslogion is to show first, in chapters II and III, that that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived exists, and then, in the subsequent chapters, that that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived is God, i.e., has the various perfections traditionally ascribed to God. The major task of the book is to argue that neither chapter II nor chapter III contains a "logically complete and independent" argument for the existence of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived, but that taken together, they provide the premises for the propositions that that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived exists, cannot be thought not to exist, and cannot not exist. Moreover, La Croix argues that there are no new arguments presented in Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo: all the apparently new arguments merely make explicit what was left implicit in the Proslogion. As one can guess from these few remarks, there is much to quarrel with in La Croix’s book, but that is a never-ending feature of historical interpretation, and one can certainly sympathize with La Croix’s complaints against the other two interpretations. Unfortunately, La Croix relies on the Charlesworth translation of the Proslogion and the Reply, a translation which is not to be used without great care.—W. E. M. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify the consequences of new scientific and philosophical approaches for the practical-theoretical framework of modern developmental biology. I highlight normal development, and the instructive-permissive distinction, as key parts of this framework which shape how variation is conceptualised and managed. Furthermore, I establish the different dimensions of biological variation: the units, temporality and mode of variation. Using the analytical frame established by this, I interpret a selection of examples as challenges to the instructive-permissive distinction. These examples include (...) the phenomena of developmental plasticity and transdifferentiation, the role of the microbiome in development, and new methodological approaches to standardisation and the assessment of causes. Furthermore, I argue that investigations into organismal development should investigate the effects of a wider range of kinds of variation including variation in the units, modes and temporalities of development. I close by examining various possible opportunities for producing and using normal development free of the assumptions of the instructive-permissive distinction. These opportunities are afforded by recent developments, which include new ways of producing standards incorporating more natural variation and being based on function rather than structure, and the ability to produce, store, and process large quantities of data. (shrink)

Biologists who work on the pig (_Sus scrofa_) take advantage of its similarity to humans by constructing the inferential and material means to traffic data, information and knowledge across the species barrier. Their research has been funded due to its perceived value for agriculture and medicine. Improving selective breeding practices, for instance, has been a driver of genomics research. The pig is also an animal model for biomedical research and practice, and is proposed as a source of organs for cross-species (...) transplantation: xenotransplantation. Genomics research has informed transplantation biology, which has itself motivated developments in genomics. Both have generated models of correspondences between the genomes of pigs and humans. Concerning genomics, I detail how researchers traverse species boundaries to develop representations of the pig genome, alongside ensuring that such representations are sufficiently porcine. In transplantation biology, the representations of the genomes of humans and pigs are used to detect and investigate immunologically-pertinent differences between the two species. These key differences can then be removed, to ‘humanise’ donor pigs so that they can become a safe and effective source of organs. In both of these endeavours, there is a tension between practices that ‘humanise’ the pig (or representations thereof) through using resources from human genomics, and the need to ‘dehumanise’ the pig to maintain distinctions for legal, ethical and scientific reasons. This paper assesses the ways in which this tension has been managed, observing the differences between its realisations across comparative pig genomics and transplantation biology, and considering the consequences of this. (shrink)

This article focuses on the occasional individuals of many species that live longer than is usual for their populations – here called longevity outliers. They appear to be exceptions to the usual patterns of mortality rates that increase with age. There is no model of survivorship that accommodates all of these individuals. They are less vulnerable to the usual causes of death than most in their populations. There are hints of genetically based mechanisms in the form of life‐prolonging genes in (...) invertebrates and genetic resistance to fatal diseases in higher organisms. The reasons why longevity outliers ultimately die are not known. Based on well‐established trends, I predict that there will be many more humans reaching very old ages in the next century. (shrink)

Brian Ellis has argued that the assigning of forces is, in the final analysis, a matter of convention. This conclusion is backed by the premises (1) that forces and force-effects are necessary and sufficient for each other, and (2) that the classification of some state of affairs as a force-effect is at least partly conventional. We argue that the first premise is false, that the second premise is ambiguous as between several senses of "conventional," and finally that he has not (...) established that force-effects are conventional in the sense required for the conclusion he wishes to draw. (shrink)